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Leney: Civil Procedure

CIVIL PROCEDURE

WHITE v. McGINNIS: THE NINTH CIRCUIT
EXPANDS CIVIL JURY TRIAL WAIVER
I.

INTRODUCTION

In White v. McGinnis,l the Ninth Circuit held that a civil
litigant's knowing participation in a bench trial without objection constituted waiver of a timely jury demand. 2 This case overruled Palmer v. United States 3 in which the Ninth Circuit determined that acquiesence to a bench trial did not constitute
waiver of a jury trial demand. 4 This article will examine the
Ninth Circuit's rejection of the literal statutory language of civil
jury trial waiver under Rules 38(d)6 and 39(a)6 of the Federal
1. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990)(en banc)(per Hall, J.; the other
panel members were Goodwin, C. J., Browning, J., Wallace, J., Hug, J., Schroeder, J.,
Fletcher, Brunetti, J., and Fernandez, J.; Alarcon, J., concurring; Kozinski, J., dissenting,
with whom Schroeder, J., and Fletcher, J. joined).
2. White, 903 F.2d at 700.
3. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981)(acquiesence to a bench trial did not waive the right
to a jury trial where a timely demand was never properly withdrawn by oral or written
stipulation in accordance with FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) and 39(a». In Palmer the Ninth
Circuit refused to deviate from the explicit language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The language of these Rules require that once a jury
demand in a civil action has been properly asserted, it may only be withdrawn by written
stipulation or by oral stipulation in open court. Id. See infra notes 5-6.
4. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 896.
5. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) provides:
Waiver. The failure of a party to serve a demand as required
by this rule and to file it as required by Rule 5(d) constitutes a
waiver by the party of trial by jury. A demand for trial by jury
made as herein provided may not be withdrawn without the
consent of the parties.
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a) provides:
By Jury. When trial by jury has been demanded as provided
in Rule 38, the action shall be designated upon the docket as a
jury action. The trial of all issues so demanded shall be by

53

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1991

1

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 21, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 8

54

GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 21:53

Rules of Civil Procedure.
II. FACTS
In June, 1984, Edward Allen White, an Arizona State Prison
inmate,' filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,8 against
Wayne McGinnis, an Arizona State Department of Corrections
employee. 9 White alleged that McGinnis assaulted him during a
cellblock search, violating his eighth amendment rights. 1o White
made a timely demand for a jury trial,11 but the court subsequently notified the parties that the case was set for a bench
trial.I 2
During the five and one-half month period between the
bench trial notice and the trial, White failed to bring his jury
demand to the district court's attention. 13 White also failed to
object to the absence of a jury during the bench trial, all the
jury, unless (1) the parties or their attorneys of record, by
written stipulation filed with the court or by an oral stipula·
tion made in open court and entered in the record, consent to
trial by the court sitting without a jury or (2) the court upon
motion or of its own initiative finds that a right of trial by jury
of some or all of those issues does not exist under the Consti·
tution or statutes of the United States.
7. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990). White initially proceeded in
pro se, but retained private counsel who entered an appearance on Aug. 30, 1985. ld. at
700 n.1.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1991):
Civil action for deprivation of rights. Every person who, under
color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of
any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation
of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac·
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proceeding for redress. For
the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to
be a statute of the District of Columbia.
9. White, 903 F.2d at 700.
10. ld. U.S. CONST. amend. Vili provides: "Excessive hail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
11. White, 903 F.2d at 700. McGinnis did not dispute that White was entitled to a
jury trial on his claims. ld. at 700 n.2.
12. ld. at 700. Before counsel was retained, the court informed the parties on Aug. 6,
1985 that a bench trial would take place on Jan. 21, 1986. Jd.
13. ld.
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while his counsel vigorously argued the case to the judge. 14
Moreover, after the verdict was entered in favor of McGinnis,
White neither notified the district court of its procedural error
before it entered judgment against him, nor filed a motion for a
new trial after judgment. Hi
On appeal, White contended that a jury trial was required,
relying on Palmer v. United States,16 which held that the jury
trial right is fundamental and every presumption must be made
against its waiver.!' In response, the defendant argued that
White should be barred from raising the issue on appeal because
it was not previously addressed before the district court. 18
III.
A.

BACKGROUND
CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY FOUNDATION

The right to a civil jury trial under U.S. CONST. amend.
VII,19 or as specified by a federal statute, shall be preserved to
the parties inviolate. 20 To determine whether the right to a civil
jury trial exists, courts have adopted an historical test. 21 Specifically, if the right to a civil jury trial existed 200 years ago at
common law 22 when the Constitution was adopted, the right still
14. ld.
15. ld.
16. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981).
17. White, 903 F.2d at 700 (citing Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 896 (9th
Cir. 1981». White also claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. However, Nicholson v.
Rushen, 767 F.2d 1426, 1427 (9th Cir. 1985)(per curiam), held that a plaintiff in a section
1983 action who alleged excessive use of force had no right to such a claim. White, 903
F.2d at 700.
18. White, 903 F.2d at 700 (citing Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Weigel, 426 F.2d
1356, 1357 (9th Cir. 1970)(per curiam». The rule generally applied on appeal is that
errors asserted below will not be considered when the issue was not first raised in the
trial court. The rationale behind this rule is that the error might have been avoided had
it been raised first at the trial court level. 1d.
19. U.S. CONST. amend VII established the right to a civil jury trial: "In suits at
common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right to
trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of common law."
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) provides: "Right Preserved. The right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the
United States shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
21. J. LANDERS. J. MARTIN & S. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE, at 705 (2d ed. 1988)[hereinafter CIVIL PROCEDURE].
22. See CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 21, at 705-06. Separate courts of law and eq-
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exists. 23
Pursuant to Rule 38(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, any party may demand a civil jury trial on any issue triable of right by a jury.24 The party must serve a written demand
upon the other parties after the lawsuit is filed. 2 & However, the
demand cannot be filed more than ten days after service of the
last pleading that addressed legal issues which gave rise to the
jury trial right.26 If a party fails to serve a demand 27 and file it,28
the right to a civil jury trial is waived. 29 However, the demand
may not be withdrawn except by consent of the parties. so
Furthermore, Rule 39(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that when a jury trial has been demanded, the
uity existed .originally at c.omm.on law. Since plaintiff .or defendant had a jury trial in
acti.ons at law, but n.ot in equity, the jury trial right is preserved .only in acti.ons at law.
Alth.ough the distincti.on between law and equity jurisdicti.on was never abs.olute (e.g.,
the "clean up" d.octrine permitted an equity c.ourt t.o decide issues that .ordinarily W.ould
have been decided by a jury in an acti.on at law), the m.odern distincti.on has bec.ome less
clear with the merger .of law and equity and the creati.on .of new causes .of acti.on in
reSP.onse t.o a s.ocial and P.olitical .order that is m.ore c.omplex than in 1791. [d. at 703-05.
In additi.on, the reas.onableness .of all.owing the exercise .of the right t.o a jury trial in
c.omplex cases has been called int.o questi.on. [d.
23. Beac.on Theatres, Inc. v. West.over, 359 U.S. 500, 501 (1959)(legal claims must be
tried first t.o a jury when there are equitable claims by the plaintiff and legal defenses
and c.ounterclaims by the defendant).
24. FED. R. elv. P. 38(b). See supra n.ote 22 f.or a m.ore c.omplete discussi.on of which
issues have right-to-jury-trial guarantees.
25. FED, R. elV, P. 38(b).
26. FED, R. elV, p, 38(b) pr.ovides:
Demand. Any party may demand a trial by jury of any issue
triable .of right by a jury by serving UP.on the .other parties a
demand therefor in writing at any time after the c.ommencement .of the action and n.ot later than 10 days after the service
of the last pleading directed t.o such issue. Such demand may
be ind.orsed UP.on a pleading of the party.
27. FED, R. elV, p, 38(d) provides that a party demanding a civil jury trial must
serve notice .on .oPP.osing counsel and file a C.oPy .of the demand with the c.ourt clerk
pursuant t.o FED, R. elV, p, 5(d). See supra n.ote 5.
28. FED, R. eiV. p, 5(d) provides:
All papers ... shall be filed with the c.ourt either bef.ore service .or within a reas.onable time thereafter, but the c.ourt may
.on m.oti.on of a party or .on its own initiative .order that dep.ositi.ons UP.on .oral examinati.on and interr.ogat.ories, requests fur
d.ocuments, requests f.or admissi.on, and answers and reSP.onses
theret.o n.ot be tiled unless .on .order .of the c.ourt or f.or use in
the pr.oceeding,
29. FED, R. elY, p, 38(d). See supra note 5 f.or expressed language.
30. FED, R. elY. p, 38(d).
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action shall be designated on the court docket as a jury action. 31
In addition, unless a written stipulation to waive the jury trial is
filed with the court, or an oral stipulation is made in open court
on the record, all issues demanded to be tried by jury shall be so
tried. 32 The court may also find that a right to jury trial on some
or all of the issues does not exist under the Constitution or statutes of the United States. 33
B.

RAISING ISSUES FOR THE FIRST TIME ON ApPEAL

Strong policies normally preclude a civil litigant from raising the jury trial entitlement issue for the first time on appeal. S4
For example, the Seventh Circuit in Lovelace v. Dall determined
that it is unfair to permit a party to have a trial, discover it has
lost, and then because the result is unsatisfactory raise the jury
trial issue. 3~
However, the Ninth Circuit, in United States v. Gabriel,36
decided that it may review "an issue conceded or neglected below if the issue is purely one of law and the pertinent record has
been fully developed."37 Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit identified several other exceptions which allow it discretion to hear an
issue not raised below. In Bolker v. Commissioner,3s the court
recognized three narrow exceptions: (1) when review is necessary
to prevent a miscarriage of justice; (2) while appeal is pending
and a new issue arises because of a change in the law; or (3)
when the issue is purely one of law and does not require further
factual record. 39
31. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). See supra note 6 for expressed language.
32. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a).
33. Id. This determination may be made upon motion or sua sponte. Id.
34. See, e.g., Lovelace v. DaB, 820 F.2d 223, 228 (7th Cir. 1987)(per
curiam)(objection waived if not timely made; issues cannot be raised on appeal if not
raised first in district court). The principal concern is judicial economy; court judgments
should have meaning and effect instead of being a futile exercise where one party can
overturn the verdict no matter what the result. Id.
35. Id.
36. 625 F.2d 830, 831 (9th Cir. 1980)(government permitted to raise for the first
time on appeal whether the Border Patrol's two stops of defendant's vehicles constituted
"fixed checkpoint stops" in a prosecution involving the transport of illegal aliens).
37. Gabriel, 625 F.2d at 832.
38. 760 F.2d 1039 (9th Cir. 1985)(as a general rule, court of appeals will not consider
an issue for the first time on appeal, although it has the power to do so).
39. Bolker, 760 F.2d at 1042.
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EVINCE

JURY

In Palmer v. United States 40 a timely jury trial demand was
made but the district court proceeded with a bench trial. 41 The
jury trial issue emerged on appeal even though objection had not
been made to the district court's failure to acknowledge the jury
demand. 42
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held that the jury demand was
not properly withdrawn because an oral or written stipulation to
withdraw was not made as Rule 39(a)48 expressly required, and
without more, the right to object was not withdrawn by submitting to a bench trial." However, the Ninth Circuit did not hold
that a formal stipulation was the only device for the parties to
waive a prior jury trial demand. 41i Rather, the court concluded
that "[c]onduct of the parties which evinces consent and appears
on the record is sufficient to constitute a proper withdrawal and
waiver."46 Since the record was completely silent on the matter,
the Ninth Circuit found no waiver.47
The Ninth Circuit in Palmer relied upon extra-jurisdictional law from the Fourth and Second Circuits for its literal
application of Rule 39(a).48 In Millner v. Norfolk & Western
Railway,49 the Fourth Circuit held that even though objection
40. 652 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1981).
41. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 895.
42. [d.

43. FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). See supra note 6 for the expressed language.
44. Palmer, 652 F.2d at 896. The court also found that the driver was entitled to a
jury trial under the seventh amendment. Even though the issue of contribution was an
equitable issue, the Government's claim against the driver required determination of the
extent to which the driver's negligence contributed to plaintiff's injuries. It was also necessary to determine the relative fault between the driver and the Government, and
whether the Government had in fact satisfied the judgment against it in plaintiff's original negligence action. [d.
45.
46.
47.
48.

[d.
[d.
[d.
[d.

49. 643 F.2d 1005 (4th Cir. 1981)(right to jury trial or withdrawal of timely jury
demand was not waived by plaintiff's participation in evidentiary hearing before the
court, notwithstanding want of express objection). The Fourth Circuit found that aside
from the fact that the technical requirements of FED. R. CIV. P. 39 were not met, a waiver
could not be implied on general equitable principles because the motion was one "to
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was not made, a jury trial was not waived by a plaintiff's participation in an evidentiary hearing before the district court.1IO
There, the court held that under the circumstances, plaintiff
could not be fairly charged with notice that dispositive issues of
fact on which he had demanded a jury trial were to be adjudicated by the court. 111
The Second Circuit, in Rosen u. Dick,1I2 held that one defendant's jury demand was effective as to the plaintiff-trustee in
a bankruptcy proceeding who was served with the demand. 1I3
The jury demand was also effective for the claims against a codefendant and cross-claims between the defendants insofar as it
encompassed issues involving the other defendant. 1I4 However,
beyond that, the second defendant had waived whatever jury
trial rights that could have been asserted by failing to adhere to
the requirements of Rule 39(a).1111
In DeGioia u. United States Lines CO.,1I6 the Second Circuit
found that a third-party defendant did not waive the right to a
jury trial by failing to assert its original demand. 1I7 Specifically,
the district court determined that a jury trial right was still
binding on an indemnity issue where the named-defendant was
entitled to indemnification from a third-party defendant. 1I8 The
Second Circuit affirmed, even though the third-party defendant
had temporarily acquiesced in not continuing to pursue its origidismiss" and there was no indication that matters at issue would be adjudicated. Millner, 643 F.2d at 1011.
50.Id.
51. Id. at 1011 & n.l.
52. 639 F.2d 82 (2d Cir. 1980)(a general jury demand includes issues covered in later
pleadings because the demander has already told opponent that he wants a jury trial;
however, this principle does not permit a party to demand a jury trial on issues raised
subsequently with which he is not connected, nor on issues for which he could not have
demanded a jury trial in the first place).
53. Rosen, 639 F.2d at 90.
54. Id.
55. Id. See supra note 6 for Rule 39(a) requirements.
56. 304 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1962)(failure of a third-party defendant to serve a cothird-party defendant with a copy of the answer containing a claim for jury trial and
submission of the common issue of liability of both third-party defendants to a jury was
not prejudicial to the co-third-party defendant, despite actual knowledge and acquies·
cence to the demand for a jury trial).
57. DeGioia, 304 F.2d at 424 & n.l.
58.Id.
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nal demand for a jury trial. II9

D.

EROSION

OF

1.

The Ninth Circuit

THE PALMER RATIONALE

Following Palmer, the Ninth Circuit shifted from a literal
interpretation of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).60 In Reid Bros. Logging
v. Ketchikan Pulp CO.,61 the Ninth Circuit held that defendant's
continued efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury demand showed that
defendant was not relying on his own right to a jury tria1. 62 The
court determined defendant's actions constituted waiver of its
right to substitute its own jury trial demand for plaintiff's when
plaintiff withdrew its jury request. 6S
The Ninth Circuit further distanced itself from the literal
interpretation approach of Palmer in Pope v. Savings Bank of
Puget Sound. 64 Pope was distinguished from Palmer because the
appellant's conduct was found to be "much more than silence,"
and thus, amounted to waiver of the jury demand. 611
59.Id.
60. See White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 701 (9th Cir. 1990).
61. 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.)(defendant's consistent efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury
request demonstrated that defendant was not relying on that request and constituted
waiver of defendant's right to object when plaintiff eventually withdrew its jury request),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983).
62. Reid Bros. Logging, 699 F.2d at 1304.
63. Id. at 1303-04.
64. 850 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1988)(plaintiff's counsel knowingly consented to waiver
of the right to jury trial because (1) he stated that he was done with the jury; and then
(2) continued to participate in the trial without objection for over one-and-a-half hours
after the jury had departed).
65. Pope, 850 F.2d at 1355. Appellant had informed the district court that he had
rested "the first part of his case and not the part of the case which [was) to be tried to
the court on the foreclosure action." Id. The trial judge then informed counsel that he
would discharge the jury before lunch. After lunch, appellant moved to reconvene the
jurors, asserting that they had been improperly discharged. Id. The trial judge denied
the motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed on appeal. Id. at 1354-55.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that appellant's conduct was little more than actual knowledge that the trial court intended to dismiss the jury. However, "the totality
of the circumstances (t)here manifests that the attorney slept on his client's rights." Id.
at 1355. The appellant's attorney had unsuccessfully argued that the reason that he had
not objected to the judge's improper discharge of the jury was that he did not know if it
was permissible to raise such an objection. Id. However, the appellate panel discounted
the attorney's argument by determining that one may "not use decorum and respect for
the court as a double-edged sword to resurrect voluntarily relinquished rights." Id. at
1355 n.29.
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In contrast to Palmer's literal compliance with Rule 39(a),
the court in Pope did not discuss the necessity of a stipulation
withdrawing the jury demand. 66 Instead, Palmer was cited for
the proposition that conduct can evince consent to withdrawal
and waiver.67 Thus, unlike the circumstances in Palmer, objection was both proper and necessary to protect a client's important right.68
2.

Other Circuits

Decisions from other circuits illustrate the same dissatisfaction with Palmer that the Ninth Circuit identified in White. 69
For example, the Second Circuit held, in Royal American Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding CO.,70 that a stock purchaser waived
his right to a jury trial by participating without objection in a
bench trial that involved issues not submitted to a jury.71 The
Seventh Circuit held, in Lovelace v. Dall,72. that an inmate
waived his previously asserted jury demand because he failed to
object to a bench trial in a pro se civil action. 73 In United States
v. 1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air,74 claimants in the
Fourth Circuit waived their right to a jury in a forfeiture proceeding for two reasons.7~ First, claimants had participated in
the bench triaP6 Second, claimants had failed to object to the
Id. at 1355.
Id.
Id.
See White, 903 F.2d at 703, in which the court discussed this dissatisfaction.
70. 885 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1989)(participation in a bench trial without objection
constitutes waiver of a jury trial right).
71. Royal American Managers, Inc., 885 F.2d at 1018.
72. 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987)(per curiam}Uudicial economy and fairness to the
winning party' require that the jury demand waiver rule should be applied to pro se
parties).
73. Lovelace, 820 F.2d at 228-29. The Seventh Circuit did concede, however, that
exceptional circumstances might arise where a pro se litigant's silence during a bench
trial does not waive the jury demand despite there being no other ground for a remand.
I d. at 229 n.4.
74. 777 F.2d 947 (4th Cir. 1985)(the right to a jury is waived after making an initial
demand for a jury trial by participating in a bench trial and failing to object to the
court's decision to determine factual issues).
75. Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 950-51.
76. Id. at 950-51. Unlike the plaintiff in Millner v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 643 F.2d
1005 (4th Cir. 1981), who had no notice that the trial court was deciding dispositive
issues of fact in an evidentiary hearing, in Beechcraft, defendants were clearly aware
that the district court was planning to decide dispositive issues of fact without a jury.
Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 951.
66.
67.
68.
69.
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district court's decision to determine dispositive issues of fact.77
The Eighth Circuit, in Allen v. Barnes Hospital,78 found that a
pro se complainant waived the right to a jury trial in a wrongful
termination suit when objection was not made to submission of
the case to the judge instead of a jury.79
IV.

A.

THE COURT'S ANALYSIS
MAJORITY OPINION

The Ninth Circuit held that a civil litigant's knowing participation in a bench trial without objection constituted waiver of a
timely jury demand. 80 The majority acknowledged the Palmer
standard,81 but explained that subsequent Ninth Circuit cases82
deviated from Palmer's literal application of Rule 39(a).83 The
majority also noted a similar approach in other circuits,84 remarking that support for the Palmer analysis had become narrowly circumscribed within those circuits. 81i
In overruling Palmer, the Ninth Circuit majority decided
that Rule 39(a) is designed to protect against some careless
statement or ambiguous document from being held as a waiver
when one was not intended. 88 However, if the parties have acquiesced to a bench trial, the Ninth Circuit will "not upset an otherwise valid bench trial simply because the letter of Rule 39(a)
has not been followed."87
77. Beechcraft, 777 F.2d at 951.
78. 721 F.2d 643 (8th Cir. 1983)(per curiam)(failure to object to submission of an
employment action to a judge instead of a jury waived the right to a jury trial).
79. Allen, 721 F.2d at 644.
80. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 700 (9th Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 700.
82. Reid Bros. Logging v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292, 1303-05 (9th Cir.
1983); Pope v. Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345, 1355 (9th Cir. 1988). See
supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text.
83. FED R. CIV. P. 39(a); see note 6 for expressed language; White, 903 F.2d at 703.
84. See White, 903 F.2d at 703. The Second and Fourth Circuits also departed from
a strict interpretation of FED. R. CIV. P. 39(a). White, 903 F.2d at 703.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
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CONCURRENCE

Judge Alarcon, concurring, would have overruled Palmer on
other grounds, reasoning that if a party were permitted to raise
the jury trial issue for the first time on appeal, the trial judge
would be effectively "ambushed."88 He found persuasive the reasoning by the Palmer dissent89 that it is dispositive if an issue is
not preserved for appeal because then it is unnecessary to decide
whether participation in a bench trial without objection constitutes waiver of a timely jury demand. 90
Judge Alarcon relied on reasoning set forth in Lovelace v.
Dall and Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Weigel 92 which suggested that an error asserted on appeal should not be considered
if a substantive or procedural issue were not raised in the lower
court since the potential error might have been avoided had the
issue been previously raised. 93 Ultimately, Judge Alarcon agreed
with the majority's decision 94 because the defendant knew a jury
trial had not been granted. 91i However, he noted that the mistake
had not been brought to the court's attention so there had been
no opportunity to correct the error. 96 By prohibiting correction
of the error, a litigant would be prevented from asserting an issue on appeal that for strategic reasons he might have intentionally ignored in the district court.97
91

88. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 704 (Alarcon, J., concurring)(quoting Palmer
v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981)).
89. Palmer v. United States, 652 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1981)(Chambers, J.,
dissenting).
90. White, 903 F.2d at 704.
91. 820 F.2d 223 (7th Cir. 1987)(per curiam). See supra note 34 and accompanying
text.
92. 426 F.2d 1356 (9th Cir. 1970)(per curiam). See supra note 18 and accompanying
text.
93. White, 903 F.2d. at 704.
94. [d.
95. [d.
96. [d. "A party will not be allowed to speculate with the court by letting error go

unremarked and then seek a new trial on the basis of the error if the outcome of the case
is unfavorable to him." [d. (quoting 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE § 2472, at 455 (lst ed. 1971)).
97. White, 903 F.2d at 705 (citing Partenweederei, MS Belgrano v. Weigel, 313 F.2d
423,425 (9th Cir. 1962)(per curiam)). This strategy sets the scope of the lawsuit, thereby
preventing piecemeal litigation and consequent waste of time of both trial and appellate·
courts. It also gives the appellate court the benefit of the district court's wisdom. [d.
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Diverging from the majority, Judge Alarcon did not perceive
that White failed to propound a lega:l issue, but rather he failed
to object to an obvious procedural error. 98 Judge Alarcon did not
believe, nor did the majority suggest, that it had been demonstrated that justice demanded reversal since White failed to object to the absence of a jury.99 Except for Palmer, Judge Alarcon
was unable to find precedent to support the notion that an issue
could be raised on appeal when the appellant had known of the
error but had not objected at the trial court level. loo In affirming
the district court, Judge Alarcon reasoned that the majority's rationale might encourage litigants to remain silent in the face of
clear error, await judgment of the court, and then raise the issue
on appeal. 101
C.

DISSENT

The dissent would have reaffirmed Palmer, as it disagreed
with the majority's approach that preservation of the right to a
jury trial should not be "formalistic" or "rigid."102 Judge Kozinski for the dissent criticized the majority's opinion as "engrafting a judicially-created exception onto the statutory language"103
of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).104
He emphasized that the language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a) is
clear and unambiguous. 1011 There was neither a written nor oral
98. White, 903 F.2d at 705. The majority had agreed to consider the merits because
of its previous ruling that it would entertain legal issues not raised below which were
purely legal and where the record was fully developed. [d. (citing United States v,
Gabriel, 625 F.2d 830, 832 (9th Cir. 1980)).
In, In re Southland Supply, Inc., 657 F.2d 1076 (9th Cir. 1981)(general rule that
appellate courts will not review issues not objected to at trial except to prevent manifest
injustice also applies in bankruptcy proceedings appeals), the Ninth Circuit determined
that it would not review an objection to a trial procedure not raised below "unless necessary to prevent manifest injustice." White, 903 F.2d at 705 (citing In re Southland Supply, Inc., 657 F.2d 1076, 1079 (9th Cir. 1981)).
99. White, 903 F.2d at 705.
100. [d.
101. [d.
102. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d 699, 705 (9th Cir. 1990)(Kozinski, J., dissenting,
with whom Schroeder, J. and Fletcher, J. joined).
103. [d.
104. [d.

105. White, 903 F.2d at 706. A timely jury demand "may not be withdrawn without
the consent of the parties" and consent may only be expressed either "by written stipulation," or "by an oral stipUlation made in open court and entered on the record." [d.
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stipulation consenting to a bench trial in White. lo6 Thus, the
dissent opined that the court should have followed the clear
mandate of the Rules as interpreted by Palmer to reverse the
district court.I07
Judge Kozinski asserted that there should be a literal approach to rules and statutes. I08 He buttressed his arguments l09
by focusing on other language within Rule 38 which provides
that the seventh amendment jury trial right shall be strictly preserved to the parties. 110 The dissent explained that this language
was to prevent the inadvertent forfeiture of the protections built
(quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 38(d) and 39(a».
Judge Kozinski's reasoning was founded on a recent United States Supreme Court
case which determined that the process of statutory interpretation starts with the statute's language. See Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304, 308 (1989). In Hal/strom, the Court held that the language of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act,
42 U.S.C. section 6972(a)(1) (1988), was explicitly clear that it was mandatory that any
person must notify the Environmental Protection Agency, in the state in which the violation of the Act occurred, and the alleged violator must be given 60 days before commencing the litigation. Id. Since the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were created by the
Supreme Court under the Rules Enabling Act (28 U.S.C. § 2072) (1988), the courts are
required to treat the Federal Rules as they would statutes. Id. See also Bethesda Hosp.
Ass'n v. Bowen, 108 S. Ct. 1255, 1258 (1988)(administrative regulations governing reimbursement of malpractice insurance costs were held valid because strained statutory interpretation by the Secretary was inconsistent with the express language of the statute).
106. White, 903 F.2d at 706.
107. Id.
108. Id. Judge Kozinski cited two recent Supreme Court cases to support that there
should be a literal approach to rules and statutes. Id. at 706 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304 (1988) and Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension
Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990)(a constructive trust on union official's pension benefits in
favor of the union is not warranted, even though the official had embezzled funds from
the union). "'[I)n the long run, experience teaches that strict adherence to the procedural requirements specified by the legislature is the best guarantee of evenhanded administration of the law.' " Id. (quoting Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 110 S. Ct. 304,
311 (1988), quoting Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980». "[C)ourts should
be loath to announce equitable exceptions to legislative requirements or prohibitions
that are unqualified by the statutory text." White, 903 F.2d at 706 (quoting Guidry v.
Sheet Metal Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680, 687 (1990».
109. White, 903 F.2d 706. Judge Kozinski conceded that the result in Palmer appeared to be a "triumph of form over substance" in that plaintiff sat silent during the
proceedings and raised his obj~ction only after the outcome proved unsatisfactory to
him. However, Judge Kozinski believed that the majority's flexible interpretation of the
rule in response to apparent exigencies of a particular case could work greater unfairness
upon larger numbers of litigants. Id.
110. Id. FED. R. CIV. P. 38(a) states in pertinent part: "[T)he right of trial by jury as
declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution ... shall be preserved to the
parties inviolate."(emphasis added).
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into Rules 38 and 39 and the constitutional right to a jury trial
itself.lll
Judge Kozinski noted that the defendant as well as the
plaintiff, could have informed the district court of its error.ll2
He emphasized that defendant was represented by counsel at all
times, and knew the plaintiff had requested a jury.1I3 Therefore,
he argued that deprivation of plaintiff's rights was not entirely
plaintiff's fault, as the majority and concurrence concluded. 114
Judge Kozinski conceded that by reaffirming Palmer, as he
proposed, the Ninth Circuit would be alone in adhering to the
literal language of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).1l6 However, he noted
several previous Ninth Circuit decisions bolstered his position. lIS
Judge Kozinski emphasized that the Ninth Circuit's en banc
decision in United States u. Fernandez-Angulo,ll7 which was
decided immediately prior to White, supported his analysis. lIS
In Fernandez-Angulo, it was held that a remand for resentencing was required when a district court failed to make findings
111. White, 903 F.2d at 706.
112. [d.
113. [d. Judge Kozinski also suggested that the elementary research by the defend-

ant would have revealed that plaintiff's right was not waived by acquiescence or mute
assent. [d.
114. [d.
115. [d.
116. [d. Judge Kozinski cited the following cases as partial support for his argu-

ment: Purba v. INS, 884 F.2d 515, 517-18 (9th Cir. 1989)(a deportation hearing had to be
physically "before" an immigration judge). United States v. Buzard, 884 F.2d 475, 475-76
(9th Cir. 1989)(courts lack authority to extend time for filing notice of appeal under FED.
R. App. P. 4(b) upon a showing of "excusable neglect"). Buzard was rendered because
FED. R. CRIM. P. 49(c) expressly states that a clerk's failure to notify a party of entry of
judgment is no excuse. White, 903 F.2d at 707.
Also, United States v. Eccles, 850 F.2d 1357, 1359-60 (9th Cir. 1988), held that the
government was not permitted to pursue an interlocutory appeal of a suppression ruling
unless the certificate required in 18 U.S.C. § 3731 was filed on time. United States v.
Avendano-Camacho, 786 F.2d 1392, 1394 (9th Cir. 1986), exemplified that deadlines for
filing notice of appeal were mandatory, and an exception could not be created for attorney neglect.
Further, in International Ass'n of Ironworkers' Local Union 75 v. Madison Indus.,
733 F.2d 656, 658-59 (9th Cir. 1984), the Ninth Circuit upheld the rule that 28 U.S.C. §
1291 required notice of appeal to be filed within 30 days of judgment on the merits even
though attorneys' fees remained unresolved. Finally, in United States v. Armored Trans.,
Inc., 629 F.2d 1313,1316-17 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981), FED. R.
CRIM P. 6(g) was literally construed to require that the grand jury's term was to begin on
the impanelment date, regardless of the first day of service.
117. United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990)(en bane).
118. White, 903 F.2d at 707.
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pursuant to FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D).1l9 The Ninth Circuit
rejected a "practical interpretation" that would have avoided resentencing because such a determination would have also
glossed over the specific language and clear mandate of the
Rule. 120
Judge Kozinski's principal criticism of the majority's analysis centered on the injustice a plaintiff would suffer by relying
on Palmer.121 He argued that the majority's approach was not
only inconsistent with Fernandez-Angulo, but also raised serious
questions as to the proper method of interpreting and applying
federal rules of procedure in the Ninth Circuit. 122 Contrary to
Fernandez-Angulo, which held Rule 32's plain language binding,123 White u. McGinnis, through a different en bane panel of
judges, treated the literal language of Rules 38 and 39 as little
more than obstacles to be overcome in depriving plaintiff of his
constitutional right to a jury trial. 124
119. United States v. Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d at 1515-16. After appellant Fernandez-Angulo pled guilty, a pre-sentence report was prepared stating that he was experienced in the drug t~ade and had initiated the negotiations leading to the crimes to
which he had pled guilty. At sentencing, the district court failed: (1) to resolve the disputed factual matters; (2) to state that the contested factual matters would not be taken
into account in sentencing the defendant; and (3) to append to the presentence report a
written record of any findings or determinations which resolved the controverted matters. [d. at 1515.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 32(c)(3)(D) provides:
If the comments of the defendant and defendant's counselor
testimony or other information introduced by them allege any
factual inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report or
the summary of the report or part thereof, the court shall, as
to each matter controverted, make (i) a finding as to the allegation, or (ii) a determination that no such finding is necessary because the matter controverted will not be taken into
account in sentencing. A written record of such findings and
determinations shall be appended to and accompany any copy
of the presentence investigation report thereafter made available to the Bureau of Prisons.
120. See Fernandez-Angulo, 897 F.2d at 1516, in which the Ninth Circuit asserted,
"[s)trict compliance with the rule is required." [d. While noting that other circuits had
split on the question, the Ninth Circuit concluded that "the brightline [it) adopt[ed)
imposes no onerous burden on district courts and is most faithful to the language of the
Rule." [d.
121. White, 903 F.2d at 708. Plaintiff-appellant White "discharged fully" the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the law of the Ninth Circuit in securing his right to a
jury trial. [d.
122. [d.
123. 897 F.2d at 1515-16.
124. White, 903 F.2d at 708. Both White and Fernandez-Angulo involved a defend-
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CRITIQUE

The holding in White v. McGinnis presents a danger. If
Rules 38 and 39 are interpreted non-literally, courts may liberally construe other rules and statutes in the name of substance
over procedure.
More significantly,. the holding creates uncertainty as to
whether the Ninth Circuit will follow a liberal or literal application of a given procedural rule. Such confusion will likely produce a flurry of unnecessary appeals premised on inconsistent
statutory and constitutional interpretation.
Notably, White was the first Ninth Circuit court case that
did not involve affirmative conduct amounting to a stipulation of
jury trial waiver.l2G The plaintiff's conduct in White, according
to the majority, was "nothing more than silence"126 because he
did not actively participate in the bench trial. 127
The majority regarded White as an opportunity, therefore,
to align the Ninth Circuit with the case law of its sister circuits.
ant's failure to call the district court's attention to its noncompliance with procedural
rules. White 903 F.2d at 708 n.4. The dissent stressed that the Ninth Circuit should
conform to its own guiding principals rather than those of other circuits, reasoning that
the rules pertaining to trial conduct can differ somewhat among circuits, even among
districts, without creating unfairness for the litigants in either jurisdiction according to
the dissent. [d. at 708. However, unfairness arises where settled rules change within a
jurisdiction. [d. The dissent also asserted that adhering to the rule set down in Palmer
would have minimal impact since waiver of the right to a civil jury trial had not come up
on appeal in the Ninth Circuit since Palmer in 1981, and only 14 appellate decisions
nationwide had raised this issue in the previous 41 years. [d.
125. White, 903 F.2d 699, 708 (9th Cir. 1990). In both Reid Bros. Logging v. Ketchikan Pulp Co., 699 F.2d 1292 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 916 (1983), and Pope v.
Savings Bank of Puget Sound, 850 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1988), the respective parties
waived the right to trial by jury by performing affirmative acts which formed part of the
trial record and which the court could plausibly interpret as an oral or written stipulation. White, 903 F.2d at 703.
In Pope, the plaintiff knowingly consented to waiver of the right to a jury trial
where counsel stated that he was done with the jury. White, 903 F.2d at 708. In Reid
Bros. Logging, defendant's consistent efforts to defeat plaintiff's jury request, i.e. filing a
motion to strike the jury demand in an appearance before the district court judge,
demonstrated that defendant was not relying on that request and constituted a waiver of
the defendant's rights to object when plaintiff eventually determined to withdraw its
jury request. White, F.2d at 708.
126. White, 903 F.2d at 699-700.
127. [d.
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For that reason, the majority rejected the formalistic approach
to civil jury trial waiver advanced by Palmer and adopted a
"nothing more than silence" definition of plaintiff's conduct, to
significantly modify the meaning of Rules 38(d) and 39(a).128
Seemingly, this remedy was fashioned to halt the potential procedural abuse by a party who could unsuccessfully argue the
merits of his case, but then unjustly avail himself of another opportunity to present the substantive issues in another forum.
Our legal system militates against relitigation of claims and
issues which have been tried and decided.129 However, an
equally compelling policy dictates that to implement Congress's
specific intent, it is the statute's specific language, and interpretation of rules based on congressional statutes, that should
govern. ISO
Appellate decisions should not be based on whether a
purely legal issue was raised and whether the record was fully
developed, as the majority in White required. l31 As Judge Alarcon suggested in his concurring opinion, if an issue is not raised
at trial, it ordinarily should not be argued on appeal. 132 This is
the most balanced approach to the dilemma courts face when a
party appears accidentally or purposefully to rely on a procedural error to gain a substantive advantage. 133 Adherence to this
established policy preserves expectations that rules and statutes
will be construed in a strict, literal, and consistent manner.13'
Failure to object should waive the issue on appeal, whether
for jury trial or other error. l3Ii This approach is clearly the most
practical from the standpoint of judicial economy. Litigants
would then be obligated to remedy error in the trial court where
the case had originated.
128. Id.
129. See Cleary, Res Judicata Reexamined, 57 YALE L.J. 339 (1948), for a more
complete discussion of res judicata.
130. See Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc. 447 U.S. 102, 108
(1980)(the starting point for interpreting statutory language should be the statute itself).
131. White, 903 F.2d at 700 nA (citing United States v. Gabriel, 625 F.2d 830, 832
(9th Gir. 1980)).
132. Id. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
133. White, 903 F.2d at 700 nA.
134. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
135. 9 C.WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2472, at 455 (lst
ed. 1971).
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The dissenting opinion in White, if ever adopted, also
presents a potential danger. The dissent in White concluded
that it is the defendant's as well as the plaintiff's obligation to
raise the trial court's procedural error. IS6 The dissent disagreed
with creating an exception to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. ls7 Also, it appeared to advance the proposition that both
parties might have the duty to inform the trial court of its procedural error under pain of reversal on appeal. IS8 Such a suggestion undermines the principle of adversarial confrontation.
The Ninth Circuit in White, by overturning Palmer, did
align itself with other circuits. 139 However, Palmer's demise is
inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit's history of strict and literal
adherence to rules and statutes. 140 White also conflicts with
United States Supreme Court cases which discourage judicial exceptions· that are contrary to procedural requirements specified
by the legislature. 141
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit in White u. McGinnis 142 established an
inconsistent basis of literal/non-literal interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court attempted to fashion a
136. White, 903 F.2d at 707.
137. I d. at 705-06.
138. See White, 903 F.2d at 707.
139. See Wool v. Real Estate Exch., 179 F.2d 62, 63 (D.C. Cir. 1949)(where counsel
for defendant acquiesced in action of the trial judge in dismissing the jury after some of
the evidence was in and then proceeding to decide the case himself as an equity judge,
alleged right to a jury trial was waived); Allen v. Barnes Hosp., 721 F.2d 643, 643-44 (8th
Cir. 1983)(see supra note 78 and accompanying text); Lovelace v. Dall, 820 F.2d 22:3,
227 -28 (7th Cir. 1987)(see supra note 34 and accompanying text); Sewell v. Jefferson
County Fiscal Court, 863 F.2d 461, 464-66 (6th Cir. 1988)(by failing to object at time
trial court granted motion to continue jury trial or remove case from jury trial docket
and continue case for trial before the judge, plaintiff waived right to a jury trial), cert.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 75 (1989); Southland Reship, Inc. v. Flegel, 534 F.2d 639, 643-44 (.5th
Cir. 1976)(at hearing where defense counsel stated that jury trial had been requested on
damage claims, only right to jury trial on liability issues was waived); United States v.
1966 Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947, 950-51 (4th Cir. 1985)(see supra
note 74 and accompanying text); Royal Am. Managers, Inc. v. IRC Holding Corp., 885
F.2d lOll, 1018-19 (2d Cir. 1989)(see supra note 70 and accompanying text).
140. White v. McGinnis, 903 F.2d at 706.
141. Id. at 707 (citing Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, llO S. Ct. at 311 quoting
Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 826 (1980». See also Guidry v. Sheet Metal
Workers Nat'l Pension Fund, 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990).
142. 903 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1990).
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remedy to prevent the party from utilizing the trial court's procedural error to realize a substantive windfall,143 and to conform
with the approach taken by sister circuits. However, a litigant's
perception of how the court will interpret procedural rules will
be most assuredly obscured by this decision.
Portions of the majority's opinion suggest evolution from a
formalistic approach to preserving the jury trial right. 144 However, the strict adherence to procedural requirements promulgated most notably by the Ninth Circuit in United States u.
Fernandez-Angulo,!46 and by the Supreme Court in Hallstrom
u. Tillamook County 146 and Guidry u. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund,147 seems likely to generate new controversies in which the courts will debate to what extent, if any, rules
of procedure should be followed literally and take precedence
over substance.
Herber Carlton Leney, Jr. *

143. White, 903 F.2d at 700. Plaintiff knowingly participated in a bench trial and
then appealed the adverse verdict, based on non-waiver of his jury trial rights. [d.
144. [d. at 701-03.
145. 897 F.2d 1514 (9th Cir. 1990)(en bane). See supra notes 117-24 and accompanying text.
146. 110 S. Ct. 304 (1989). See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text.
147. 110 S. Ct. 680 (1990). See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of December 1991.
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